Chapter 4: Disasters are Different

Chapter 4: DISASTERS ARE DIFFERENT

Disasters can damage emergency response resources. This photograph shows the collapsed ambulance bays at Olive View Hospital, a result of the San Fernando Valley earthquake of February 9,1971. (Courtesy of the Los Angeles County Fire Department, Los Angeles, California.)

WHAT IS A DISASTER?

What is a disaster? The term often suggests images such as earthquakes, tidal waves, floods, hurricanes, and explosions, and yet it is difficult to define a disaster by physical characteristics alone. Is the flooding of an uninhabited, uncultivated plain a disaster? What about a landslide in a deserted canyon? In general, to be considered a disaster, these events have to affect an area of human development.

Often, even this is not enough. An earthquake might cause little damage in California, because the target area has relatively earthquake-resistant buildings. The same amount of seismic activity in a foreign community, whose buildings have unreinforced stone walls, might result in disastrous loss of life. Thus, definition of a disaster must include consideration of a hazardous event's effect on the target population.

The impact of a hazardous event on a community is partially determined by the mechanisms and adaptations that the population has developed to deal with the effects of potentially damaging events. In some communities, natural hazards occur with such regularity that effective methods have been developed to cope with them. In such cases, the event might trigger emergency activity, but would not result in a disaster.

Imagine the impact of a typical Vermont winter on Southern Florida, or a monsoon season in Phoenix, Arizona. Vermont does not declare a disaster every winter, because the residents have adapted to the weather there. Cincinnati, Ohio, is an example of a city which has adapted to frequent flooding. Located in the flood plain of the Ohio River Valley, Cincinnati is subject to flooding about every 14 months. As a result, local organizations have developed a sophisticated set of procedures for responding to floods. These are so effective that flooding emergencies do not inordinately disrupt the community's coping mechanisms (Anderson, 1965).

The amount of property destruction and numbers of deaths and injuries are often used as a criteria for defining a disaster, but this may be somewhat misleading. A ten-victim, multiple vehicle collision might overwhelm a rural community hospital, whereas the same event may not cause undue problems at a large urban trauma center. Research does suggest that non-routine procedures and inter-organizational coordination are almost always required when a civilian disaster produces more than 120 casualties (Wright, 1977:190). In contrast, much more death, injury, and loss of material are managed in wartime without exceeding the ability of the system to respond effectively and smoothly. Bomb shelters, fire control, management of debris clearance, and systems for handling the dead and wounded become routine (Yutzy, 1969:36).

Some disaster plans identify three levels of disaster. A typical version is described in The Student Manual for Disaster Management and Planning for Emergency Physician's Course (ACEP:1-2):

Level I: A localized multiple casualty emergency wherein local medical resources are available and adequate to provide for field medical treatment and stabilization, including triage. The patients will be transported to the appropriate local medical facility for further diagnosis and treatment.

Level II: A multiple casualty emergency where the large number of casualties and/or lack of local medical care facilities are such as to require multi-jurisdiction (regional) medical mutual aid.

Level III: A mass casualty emergency wherein local and regional medical resource's capabilities are exceeded and/or over-whelmed. Deficiencies in medical supplies and personnel are such as to require assistance from state or federal agencies.

These definitions of disaster levels can be useful for planning different levels of disaster response, but one caution is in order. It must be recognized that even in local (Level I) disasters, federal and state agencies are often involved, and need to be considered when coordination procedures are planned.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency defines disaster as:

Holloway, a physician who has written a number of articles on disaster management, defines a disaster as:

This requirement, to do things in non-routine ways, often under conditions of extreme urgency, is one of the keys to understanding disaster response problems. Often, to a significant degree, disaster-stricken communities end up improvising their responses.

A common disaster planning assumption is, "Good disaster response is merely an extension of good, routine, daily emergency procedures." (Quarantelli, 1981a:10; Quarantelli, 1983:87; Tierney, 1977:153; Orr, 1983:603; Gratz, 1972:48; ACEP:9-2; Sorensen, 1981:27) In contrast to this assumption, this chapter will discuss the ways in which disasters differ from more routine, daily emergencies, and why the normal ways in which communities cope with routine emergencies may not always work well in disasters. These differences are not limited to questions of magnitude. While it is true that the destruction posed by a disaster is often greater than that from routine emergencies, there are also differences in the types of problems that must be handled, the types of tasks that must be carried out, and the types of help available. Thus, responding to a disaster involves more than merely mobilizing greater numbers of emergency personnel and greater quantities of supplies.

ROUTINE PATTERNS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

The management of routine, daily emergencies in the United States is influenced by a national preference for local control and private enterprise. The result is a complex, decentralized structure where the various tasks are divided up among a myriad of independent public and private organizations and individuals (Drabek, 1985a:85; Drabek, 1987:105; Quarantelli, 1981c:68). Which organization does what at the scene of an emergency is usually determined by tradition and is formalized in laws, contracts, and charters. The geographical areas to which each emergency agency responds and the roles and responsibilities of each are often mutually understood. Occasional jurisdictional disputes do occur, but these are usually settled by legislative or judicial procedures, or by informal negotiations over a period of time.

Since local emergencies usually involve the same set of emergency organizations, each is eventually able to carry out its tasks at the scene independently and with relatively little conflict or confusion. Because these tasks often do not tend to change, there is frequently not a great need for on-the-spot decisions about the responsibilities of each organization at the scene. In short, routine emergencies create little demand for ongoing, moment-to-moment coordination among the involved organizations (Quarantelli, 1985:5; Dynes, 1978:59; Dynes, 1981:12,39; Wenger, 1978:27).

As in the assignment of tasks, the assignment of resources for routine emergencies is often standardized. Each organization is budgeted a quantity of resources, and this may be done far in advance of their use-often on an annual basis. Members of each organization may be familiar with the needed re-sources, where they are located, and the standardized procedures for obtaining them. In such cases, much of the information regarding the availability of resources is known in advance of an emergency response and does not need to be communicated.


IN DISASTERS, THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND RESOURCES CHANGES

In disasters there are often conditions that may make the traditional division of labor and resources, characteristic of routine emergency management, unsuitable for disaster response:

• Disasters may put demands on organizations, requiring them to make internal changes in structure and delegation of responsibilities.
• Disasters may create demands that exceed the capacities of single organizations, requiring them to share tasks and resources with other organizations that use unfamiliar procedures.
• Disasters may attract the participation of organizations and individual volunteers who usually do not respond to emergencies.
• Disasters may cross jurisdictional boundaries, resulting in multiple organizations being faced with overlapping responsibilities.
• Disasters may create new tasks for which no organization has traditional responsibility.
• Disasters may render unusable the normal tools and facilities used in emergency response.
• Disasters may result in the spontaneous formation of new organizations that did not exist before.

Table 4-1. Differences in Disasters

Routine Emergencies	Disasters
Interaction with familiar faces	Interaction with unfamiliar faces
Familiar tasks and procedures	Unfamiliar tasks and procedures
Intra-organizational coordination needed	Intra- and inter-organizational coordination needed
Roads, telephones, and facilities intact	Roads may be blocked or jammed, telephones jammed or non- functional, facilities may be damaged
Communications frequencies adequate for radio traffic	Radio frequencies often overloaded
Communications primarily intra- organizational	Need for inter-organizational information sharing
Use of familiar terminology in communicating	Communication with persons who use different terminology
Need to deal mainly with local press	Hordes of national and international reporters (see Chapter 10)
Management structure adequate to coordinate the number of resources involved	Resources often exceed management capacity

Organizations Change Internally
Emergency response organizations may adapt to the increased demands of a disaster in a number of ways which can result in their members carrying out unfamiliar tasks with unfamiliar equipment and interacting with unfamiliar faces (Dynes, 1974:81; Dynes, 1978:50; Quarantelli, 1978:4; FEMA, 1983d:14).

Off-Duty Personnel Called In
Emergency organizations such as hospitals, ambulance companies, fire departments, and law enforcement agencies typically operate 24 hours a day. Also, some emergency organizations such as police departments may have a cadre of reserve or auxiliary officers that can be summoned for duty (Quarantelli, 1972:69). By calling in off-duty personnel, the available manpower may be quickly doubled or tripled. Unfortunately, this may also deplete the reserve of well-rested personnel if the disaster lasts longer than one work shift (Quarantelli, 1983).

Personnel Re-assigned to New Duties
Organizations may curtail nonessential activities and re-assign personnel to disaster-relevant duties (Dynes, 1981:44,62). Fire departments may re-assign fire prevention officers to fire suppression duties. Police departments may re- assign detectives, training officers, crime prevention officers, and records personnel. In addition, routine patrol activities may be reduced. Hospitals may discontinue routine services like: elective surgery, clinic services, patient education, physical therapy, medical library services, and gift shop hours (Dynes, 1981:44,62).

Everyday Procedures and Priorities Altered
In disasters, emergency organizations are often required to use different procedures and to establish different priorities for action. One example is the hospital, where medical treatment may be carried out in different areas of the facility and by different personnel than usual. Nurses sometimes end up making medical decisions, such as which patients to discharge to make room for disaster victims. Suspected fractures may be splinted without being X-rayed. Arriving patients may have been exposed to dangerous chemical or radioactive material and require decontamination. Physicians, nurses, medical students, and student nurses who do not usually work in emergency treatment areas may be pressed into service there. Registration of incoming patients may be abandoned in favor of using disaster tags. In many cases, record-keeping and billing are abandoned in favor of more rapid treatment and disposition. Hospital switchboard operators are often inundated with unusual offers of assistance or requests for information. The phone lines may quickly become so jammed that it becomes impossible to use them to get information into or out of the facility. This introduces the novel task of using alternative means to carry out communications. A system of runners may have to be set up to carry messages. Hospital security is faced with new tasks related to traffic and crowd control (Quarantelli, 1983:82,83; Worth, 1977:164; Tierney, 1985b:33,80; Williams, 1956:658; Stallings, 1971:18).

Persons manning communication and decision-making positions may be- come so overwhelmed with the volume of traffic that they are forced to perform a sort of "communications triage." That is, they must filter out all but the most essential information to transmit. A problem can occur when the person filtering the information does not understand its significance to the overall disaster effort (Stallings, 1971:18; Kilijanek, 1979:5; Dynes, 1977:10,12; Brunacini, 1985:47). This may be because the information is important to another organization whose goals and tasks are unfamiliar (Ringhofer). Confusion can also occur when other persons (those, for example, from a subdivision of the organization that has ceased to have a priority function during the disaster) are pressed into manning radios or answering phones.

Overload of communications channels and filtering of information in disasters can have widespread effects on decision-making. Getting information to higher echelon authorities in organizational bureaucracies can become too time consuming and unreliable for the situation at hand. Decisions have to be made urgently or lives and property are lost. The result is that the decision-making in disasters may tend to occur at lower levels in the organization than in routine emergencies (Drabek, 1986:121,162,171; Dynes, 1977:6; Dynes, 1978:60; Drabek, 1985a; Drabek, 1985b:20; Tierney, 1985b:32, Stallings, 1971:32; Worth, 1977:163; Rosow, 1977:74).

Organizations Share Tasks and Resources
Even with the various adaptations available to them, single organizations often do not have the resources to manage the disaster tasks at hand. It may not be possible for all the traffic to be controlled by one police department, an of the rescue and extrication to be carried out by one fire department, all the injured to be transported by one ambulance company, and all the patients to receive timely medical care at one hospital. One of the fundamental differences in disasters is that various urgent tasks may have to be divided up among multiple organizations. In contrast to the more common, large emergencies in which mutual aid is requested from familiar neighboring jurisdictions, organizations sharing tasks in disasters may be from distant locales and may have not worked together before. Preexisting mutual aid agreements or familiar procedures for working together and sharing resources may be lacking (Drabek, 1981:21; Quarantelli, 1985:5; Dynes, 1974:79; FEMA, 1983d:14; Quarantelli, 1983:64; Kilijanek, 1981:126; Quarantelli, 1981a:10; Dynes, 1981:41).

Involvement of Non-emergency Responders
Many organizations and individuals that normally do not do so on a routine basis may become involved in emergency tasks. Some organizations have traditional mandates to switch to emergency-related activities in the event of a disaster. Examples are the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, public works departments, television stations, and private utility companies. Non-emergency governmental organizations such as parks departments, purchasing departments, and building inspectors may also be pressed into disaster activities. There are others with no such mandate, but they become involved because of the perceived need and a spirit of altruism. In addition to all the individual volunteers that become involved, there are many organizations that donate their services. Examples include labor unions, church groups, scouts, civic and fraternal organizations, private helicopter operators, and heavy construction companies (Dynes, 1974:136).

Crossing of Jurisdictional Boundaries
Disasters often involve the response of many independent organizations from the private sector as well as from multiple levels of government, including federal, state, county, and city agencies, as well as special districts (such as fire districts, regional parks, and water districts). The diversity of responders is illustrated in Table 4-2 adapted from a study of search and rescue operations in disasters (Drabek, 1981).

Government in the United States is very decentralized. According to the 1982 Census of Governments, there are over 82,000 separate governments in this country. Such decentralization allows for, and in some cases even promotes, a lack of standardization. This is illustrated by the variations in the way authority is vested to activate local disaster plans, to request state disaster assistance, and to order a major evacuation. Even the organizational structures of local disaster agencies are characterized by diversity (Drabek, 1985a:85; Drabek, 1987: 107, 233; Wenger, 1986:59). This lack of standardization among the myriad of agencies representing various levels of government complicates coordination of disaster response.

Unfortunately, many organizations continue to act independently in disasters, focusing on their own organizational tasks, and sometimes failing to see or find out how their role fits into the overall response effort. This has been called by some the "Robinson Crusoe syndrome" ("We're the only ones on the island."). This narrow focus on one's own organizational goals has been observed not only in disaster response, but in planning as well. In a number of communities, the various organizations that have a role in disaster response have carried out their planning individually with little attempt to meld their plans together into a coherent overall strategy. This problem has been noted even more frequently with planning on a county- or state-wide basis. Different levels of government (city, county, state, federal, special district) may not have plans which are coordinated with each other (Quarantelli, 1983:87,103,120; Tierney, 1985a:73; Tierney, 1985b:33; NTSB, 1982:46; De Atley, 1982:33; Adams, 1982:54; Kallsen, 1983:29; Kilijanek, 1981:44; Neff, 1977:179; Seismic Safety Comm, 1979:56; Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:71).

Table 4-2. Organizations Involved in Search and Rescue

When planning has been done on an inter-organizational basis, it is more likely to result in a coordinated response.

EXAMPLE: Tornado, Wichita Falls, Texas, April 10, 1979. The city, county, and state had well rehearsed and detailed disaster plans. They were designed to fit with one another and to be complementary. The general roles and authority structure were understood by most. Following impact, the response network formed very rapidly according to the previously practiced plans (Adams, 1981b:30,40).

Political Boundaries
Earthquakes, wildfires, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and toxic spills may cause destruction over large geographical areas, simultaneously involving city, county, regional, state, and federal jurisdictions. Under such circumstances, customary divisions of responsibility may be inapplicable Quarantelli, 1985:16; Quarantelli, 1983:106; Neff, 1977:179; Tierney, 1977:154).

EXAMPLE: A railroad tank car containing a toxic volatile substance exploded at a chemical plant within the limits of a northeastern city. However, the gas cloud that resulted spread into the county area Quarantelli, 1983:58).

EXAMPLE: Volcano eruption, Mt. St. Helens, Washington, May 18, 1980. This disaster involved a large federal jurisdiction (U.S. Forest Service) and that of three counties. Further jurisdictional overlap resulted when the Governor of Washington declared the event a state disaster (Drabek, 1981).

Examples of the governmental agencies that might be involved at various levels are shown in Table 4-3.

Disasters do not need to cover large geographical areas in order to cross multiple levels of governmental responsibility. Even localized disasters can include federal jurisdiction if a navigable waterway or airport is involved. Jurisdictional boundaries may be crossed even when geographical boundaries are not. For example, the federal government may have jurisdictional involvement in a local accident involving a nuclear reactor or the crash of a military aircraft. Laws determining who has overall coordinating responsibility and authority when jurisdictions are crossed are often unfamiliar to the participants, or are vague, confusing, or nonexistent (Sorensen, 1981:46).

EXAMPLE: Tornado, Lake Pomona, Kansas, June 17,1978. This tornado struck and capsized a showboat on a federal reservoir in a state park in an unincorporated area of the county. Unfortunately, there was no existing state law which defined who should be in charge of such a situation. (Even if one existed, it would not apply to federal authorities.) The matter was only resolved after the county attorney was consulted and declared that the sheriff was the responsible authority (Drabek, 1981:35; Kilijanek, 1980:28,32).

Table 4-3. Governmental Agencies Involved in Disaster Response

Law Enforcement and Investigatory Agencies
City Police County Sheriff Coroner Park ranger State Police, highway patrol Fish and game wardens State forest/park ranger University police	Federal National Guard Secret Service Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms National forest special agents Park Police Fish and Wildlife Service Coast Guard Bureau of Indian Affairs Environmental Protection Agency Nuclear Regulatory Commission Department of Transportation Aviation Administration Highway Traffic Safety Administration Railroad Administration Maritime Administration FBI Other Fire department arson investigation bureaus
Fire Protection Agencies
Local City fire departments Local fire protection districts County fire departments State State forestry	Federal Forest Service Department of the Interior National Park Service Bureau of Indian Affairs Bureau of Land Management
Medical Organizations
V.A. hospitals County hospitals Public Health Service hospitals Military hospitals Public ambulance and rescue teams Lifeguards Military land ambulances	Military air-sea rescue State and county health offices State emergency medical services offices U.S. Park Service mountain rescue County sheriffs search and rescue teams Civil Air Patrol
Miscellaneous
Local Public works departments Welfare departments Flood control districts Cemetery district Civil defense State Mines or geology departments Seismic safety offices Civil defense Highway departments	Federal Bureau of Mines Geological Survey Army Corps of Engineers Department of Agriculture Weather Bureau Small Business Administration Federal Emergency Management Agency

EXAMPLE: Coliseum Explosion, Indianapolis, Indiana, October 31, 1963. Initially, this disaster was characterized by a general lack of coordination. Contributing to this state of affairs was ambiguity about who should be in charge. The Indianapolis Civil Defense plan specified that the County Civil Defense Director would assume command of all emergency organizations in the event of a major disaster. But in this case, there was some reluctance to call the incident a "major" disaster. City Fire Department officials would normally be in command of a fire within the city limits, but local statute also specified that the County Coroner was the absolute authority in a disaster where a death was involved.

Table 4-4. Private Sector Organizations Involved in Disaster Response

The first control was actually assumed by the City Police Chief, until 3 hours into the event. At that time, the Superintendent of the State Police raised the point that the Coliseum was located on the State Fairgrounds, and therefore, was under the jurisdiction of the State Police. Responsibility for direction of the disaster operations was transferred accordingly (Drabek, 1968:20,166).

The Private Sector
Responsibility for public welfare and safety in the United States is not limited to governmental bodies, but is also relegated to private sector organizations, businesses, and professionals (FEMA, 1983d:27). Disasters not only cross political boundaries, but also the traditional areas of private sector responsibility. Examples of the types of private organizations and institutions that may be-come involved are given in Table 4-4.

Non-routine Tasks
Another way in which disasters differ from routine emergencies is that they frequently create non-routine tasks. They also create tasks for which no organization has clear-cut responsibility. Often these tasks have no counterpart in routine emergency operations, and there are no precedents to help decide who is responsible for them (FEMA, 1983d; Quarantelli, 1965:111; Quarantelli, 1982b:159; Bush, 1981; Dynes, 1981:29; Parr, 1970:426; Dynes, 1978:51; Drabek, 1986:29). Examples include:

Situation Analysis
Disasters are characterized by great uncertainty. Often the character and extent of damage and the secondary threats (leaking chemicals, downed power lines, weakened dams) are not immediately apparent and therefore the necessary countermeasures not undertaken. Initial actions are undertaken based on vague and inaccurate information. Disasters are also very "fluid" in nature with needs changing minute-to-minute.

This fluidity necessitates a procedure for determining and updating what the overall disaster situation is and what problems need to be tackled. Typically, it is unclear to the responders who has the responsibility for this task, and in many disasters the process is neglected. When assessment of the disaster situation is carried out, it is generally done independently by a number of individual organizations. Often each agency limits its assessment to those observations of direct consequence to that particular organization. In many cases, the information obtained by these individual organizations is not shared or pooled. Accordingly, an overall picture of the scope, severity, and types of disruption and damage does not emerge early in the crisis (Parr, 1970:425; Golec, 1977:169,174; Quarantelli, 1983:67,91; Quarantelli, 1981a:23; Yutzy, 1969:118,152; Rosow, 1977:72,136,167,193; Drabek, 1986:170,186; Tierney, 1977:154). This failure may result from lack of planning or lack of familiarity with established plans.

Multi-organizational Resource Management
Disasters often create the need for different organizations to share resources (personnel, vehicles, equipment, supplies, and facilities). They also create the need for unusual resources not commonly used in daily emergencies (e.g., search dogs, satellite communications, cranes). Resources in disasters arrive from many atypical sources and often in large numbers. In addition, they are often not dispatched or requested in the routine manner. Units often respond without being asked after hearing of the disaster on their scanners, or on commercial newscasts (Quarantelli, 1983:61; Lewis, 1980:863; 1981f:39; Gordon, 1986:27; Neff, 1977:184; Stallings, 1971:12; Kallsen, 1983:26; Rosow, 1977:105). The atypical mode in which resources respond makes it difficult to tell what resources are present, where they are, what they are doing. Accordingly, it is difficult to determine what resources need to be requested or discouraged from responding. Disasters therefore create the need for procedures aimed at managing and keeping track of resources on a multi-organizational basis. (Further discussion of resource management may be found in Chapter 6.)

Inter-agency Communications
Coordination of multi-organizational task accomplishment, situation analysis, and resource management requires inter-agency communication. The requirement is not only for communications hardware (e.g., radios with compatible frequencies) but also for communications procedures. Persons having information need to know who needs it and how to get it there. Persons exchanging information need to use mutually understood terminology. (Inter-agency communications are discussed further in Chapter 5.)

Logistical Support
When organizations respond to a disaster, especially if they come from some distance away and need to stay in the disaster area for an extended period of time, they may require logistical support that cannot be provided in the routine manner (Kallsen, 1983:28; 1983). These needs may include:

• Fuel and maintenance for vehicles
• Sanitary facilities (latrines, showers)
• Food - Shelter and sleeping facilities
• Relief and replacement personnel
• Emergency message contact arrangements

Figure 4-1. Disasters often require the establishment of logistical support arrangements such as feeding facilities. (Courtesy of California Department of Forestry, Sacramento, California.)

Search and Rescue
In the typical medical emergency, an ambulance is dispatched to a known location with a definite number of victims. In disasters, however, the situation often requires looking for casualties whose exact number, location, and condition are unknown. This entails the need for widespread organized search and rescue efforts.

Federal guidelines stress the importance of specifying responsibility for search and rescue in disaster planning and operations (FEMA, 1984c:111-2; FEMA, 1985d:3-4; FEMA, 1983e:485). Nevertheless, search and rescue in many disasters has not been perceived as the primary responsibility of any of the participating local government agencies. State statutes have not helped to clarify the responsibilities. A survey published in 1979 was able to find only four states with laws specifying what agency was to be in charge of post-disaster search and rescue (FEMA, 1983b:203). Accordingly, initial disaster search and rescue has often occurred in a haphazard manner with little structure or control Quarantelli, 1983:63; Wenger, 1986:32; Dynes, 1970:432).

Figure 4-2. In contrast to daily emergencies, disasters often call for large-scale search and rescue operations as in this photo of the San Fernando Valley, California, earthquake on February 9, 1971. (Courtesy of Los Angeles County Fire Department, Los Angeles, California.)

Triage and Casualty Distribution
Ambulances responding to a routine emergency usually treat one or two casualties and transport them to a single hospital. In disasters, however, there are usually more patients than one ambulance crew or hospital can handle. Therefore, the need often exists for triage (that is, determining priorities for treatment and transport) and initiating a procedure to distribute casualties equitably among the various hospitals (Gibson, 1977:196; Tierney, 1985a:80; Quarantelli, 1983:63; Barton, 1969:69). (Triage is discussed further in Chapter 8.)

Casualty Lists
Casualty lists are important for two reasons:

• They are needed to address the inquiries of concerned loved ones. After many major disasters there is an inexorable flood of inquiries from concerned loved ones seeking information about the missing (Ross, 1982:64; Worth, 1977:164; Quarantelli, 1983:82).
• They are necessary to determine the number of missing victims for which search and rescue operations must be carried out. This task can be difficult if the missing have no relatives, were out of town when the disaster struck, or were visitors from out of town (Yutzy, 1969:122; Kilijanek, 1981:127).

In many disasters though, a single organization does not have clear-cut responsibility for maintaining casualty lists. Often the task will be attempted by the Red Cross and/or Salvation Army, but other organizations will also become involved (Kilijanek, 1981:78,128; Yutzy, 1969:122). In some disasters the Red Cross attempted to put together casualty lists, but their efforts were stymied by those who were unfamiliar with their function in this regard. Hospitals would not release the information to them for fear of breaching patient confidentiality (KC Health Dept, 1981:24B; Drabek, 1968:76).

Issuance of Passes
An important security task in disasters is keeping unauthorized persons out of the disaster area. This is often done to prevent looting, to decrease congestion hampering rescue efforts, and to prevent persons from being injured in the wreckage. Often this implies the need for passes to let in persons who have legitimate reasons to be there (for example, homeowners and businessmen retrieving salvageable goods and belongings). The lack of precedence may lead to disputes regarding who has the authority to issue passes. In some cases, several organizations may assume the task, resulting in arbitrary and inconsistent enforcement of area restrictions and protests by irate citizens (Rosow, 1977:32; Tierney, 1985b:34; Sorensen, 1981:46; Moore, 1958:17; Quarantelli, 1982b:12; Yutzy, 1969:114).

EXAMPLE: Earthquake, Anchorage, Alaska, March 27, 1964. The damaged downtown area was cordoned off, and property owners and businessmen clamored for access to their residences and stores. A "disaster control group" had been organized and began to issue passes to individuals with legitimate reason to enter the area. Anchorage Civil Defense also issued passes to virtually everyone who requested them. To further complicate matters, passes were also being issued by the State Civil Defense, the city building inspector, the police, and by other officials. Some persons with passes were not permitted entry because some of the guards had not been instructed which passes to accept as legitimate (Yutzy, 1969:116).

EXAMPLE: A hospital was flooded after a hurricane when a rain-swollen river overflowed its banks. For security reasons, access to the neighborhood was controlled by roadblocks manned by guards. The recovery operations of the hospital were hampered, because these guards would not honor the identity cards of hospital employees, who were trying to obtain supplies and equipment to clean up and repair the facility. Finally, the workers had to resort to wearing hospital lab coats so the guards would think they were doctors and let them pass (Blanshan, 1978:194).

Hazardous Material Problems
As communities gain more experience with hazardous materials incidents, which are increasing in frequency, the required coordination and technical procedures have become more familiar. In some communities, however, handling of a hazardous spill disaster still fits in the realm of a new task for which smoothly functioning procedures have yet to be developed.

There are cases where a great deal of ambiguity exists as to who has responsibility to plan for and respond to hazardous chemical accidents. For example, accidents in private chemical plants have occurred that were not considered the responsibility of public safety agencies until the hazard extended beyond the plant's boundaries.

There has also been disagreement regarding who was thought to be responsible for handling hazardous material transportation accidents. In one study, a variety of organizational respondents were questioned who should be responsible. Depending on who was asked, the answer was the manufacturer, the transporter, the state environmental protection agency, the state police, the local fire department, the military, or some other organization.

This ambiguity has sometimes been compounded by a tendency for hazardous materials transportation accidents to occur at the entrance from a highway onto private property, or where a public road crosses a private railroad line. The situation has been further complicated when laws designate certain types of local incidents as federal responsibility. For example, hazardous spills involving a navigable waterway have come under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Coast Guard, which has superseded all state and local authority in such cases Quarantelli, 1981c:33,72,94).

Handling of the Dead
Mass handling of the dead creates problems that may not have been faced in routine emergencies. For example, in hazardous materials accidents, contamination of the body and personal effects sometimes makes routine handling impossible (Dorn, 1986:120). Media attention and the lack of accurate information as to who all the victims are generates inquiries about the dead that can be national in scope (Fritz, 1956:36). Collecting information for such inquiries can be different than in routine fatalities when the disaster crosses jurisdictional boundaries. In a disaster, special materials may be needed for the recovery, identification, and care of fatalities. For example, special markers may be needed to indicate where the bodies were found; special body pouches or other containers may be required; and special provisions (for example, refrigerator trucks) may need to be acquired for the storage of large numbers of bodies (Raether, 1986:178).

Figure 4-3. Handling the dead poses different problems in disasters. This photo demonstrates the management of dead bodies after the AeroMexico crash that occurred in Cerritos, California, August 31, 1986. (Courtesy of Los Angeles County Fire Department, Los Angeles, California.)

Other Tasks
Other examples of tasks that may be unique to disasters include:

• Warning and communicating with the public (see Chapter 9)
• Shelter and feeding of displaced persons
• Evacuating neighborhoods
• Evacuating hospitals, prisons, nursing homes, and psychiatric facilities
• Coordinating volunteers (see Chapter 6)
• Acquiring and allocating unusual resources (see Chapter 6)
• Dealing with mass animal carcasses
• Dealing with livestock or family pets that had to be left behind or sheltered (Drabek, 1986:116)
• Procedures for condemning damaged buildings (Moore, 1958:84)
• Disposing of unclaimed valuables and merchandise found in the rubble at the scene (Moore, 1958:85)
• Control of air traffic (Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:15,45,70,75; Drabek, 1981:179)
• Disposing of large amounts of donations (Fritz, 1956) (see Chapter 6)
• Controlling emergency vehicle traffic, so access routes are not blocked by emergency vehicles whose drivers have parked and left them (Hamilton, 1955:50; Drabek, 1968:7,11,19; Cohen, 1982a:102; Morris, 1982)
• Checking on hospitals, nursing homes, and day care centers that may need assistance, but are without communications to call for it (1971:28; Dektar, 1971; Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:91)
• Deciding when and in which areas utilities should be cut off (Seismic Safety Comm, 1983:122)

Figure 4-4. Management of Livestock from evacuated or affected areas creates unique problems in disasters as in this photo of the "Fourty-Niner Fires" of Nevada County, California in September, 1988. (Courtesy of The Union, Grass Valley, California.)

Figure 4-5. Control of air traffic, especially helicopters, is an increasing concern in disasters as seen at the MGM Grand Hotel fire, November 21, 1980, in Las Vegas, Nevada. (Courtesy of Clark County Fire Department, Las Vegas, Nevada.)

Figure 4-6. Management of emergency vehicles may be a problem in disasters. This is illustrated by the congestion at the MGM Hotel fire. (Courtesy of Clark County Fire Department, Las Vegas, Nevada.)

Inability to Use Normal Response Tools and Facilities
In addition to being faced with unfamiliar tasks, organizations are sometimes faced with the loss of familiar response tools and facilities. Although damage to hospitals and interruption of their water and power supplies are rare in U.S. disasters (Quarantelli, 1983:81), they are a particular threat in areas of high seismic risk. More commonly, telephones, which are the routine means of communication (especially inter-organizational communication), are unusable. Even when lines have not been damaged, jammed phone circuits prevent normal outgoing communications except from telephones designated as "essential services" (those given special priority by the phone company when trunk lines are overloaded). Another "response tool" which may be, to some extent unusable, is the road and highway system needed to transport disaster response equipment and personnel.

Formation of New Organizations
When the demands of the disaster cannot be met by existing organizations, new organizations may evolve spontaneously to fill the gap. Often, they are very informal in nature and may quickly disband when the immediate crisis is over. Search and rescue, for example, is often carried out by a mixture of citizens, volunteers, and members of emergency agencies who have never worked together before. Not uncommonly, as they proceed, a transient informal network of coordination will develop. In essence, a temporary, new organization is formed (Dynes, 1974:146; Dynes, 1981:53; Drabek, 1986:218).

EXAMPLE: Hyatt Hotel Skywalk Collapse, Kansas City, Missouri, July 17, 1981. "A smoothly functioning, high-performance organization was developed on the spot. Leaders emerged, and were recognized and allowed to lead because they were capable, willing, and because it was necessary.... People ... formed an organization, almost departmentalized, with managers, assistant managers, and a work force (sic) .... These 'department heads' worked together almost as though the organization had evolved formally and over a period of years." (Stout, 1981:45)

Figure 4-7. During rescue operations at the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel skywalk collapse "a smoothly functioning, high-performance organization was developed on the spot. (Courtesy of Kansas City Fire Department, Kansas City, Missouri.)

EXAMPLE: Tornado, Flint, Michigan, June 8,1953. One of the largest contractors in Flint undertook to organize the resources of several big private companies who were donating heavy construction equipment and crews for road clearance and search and rescue. His office functioned as an informal rear headquarters. The contractor's own equipment had two-way radios, and he placed a radio-equipped car in the field to act as a sort of command post. Thus, he set up a working organization and made its services available to the local authorities (Rosow, 1977:143).

One new type of organization that eventually evolves rather typically in disasters is some form of coordinating "committee" or group. The various organizations involved in the disaster response may become aware that their individual and independent activities are inadequate. It becomes clear that a system for inter-organizational information sharing and coordination is necessary. A meeting finally occurs where representatives of the various organizations are invited, and which results in the establishment of some form of multi- organizational coordinating group (Bronson, 1959:42; Dynes, 1978:61; Dynes, 1981:30,42; Drabek, 1986:161,182,186; Kilijanek, 1981:71; Rosow, 1977:20, 122, 124; Yutzy, 1969:59,60,77,121). Unfortunately, the formation of such a group may not be accomplished in time to benefit many of the victims (Moore, 6 1958:15; Mhjanek, 1981:71; Stallings, 1971:25; Rosow, 1977:20, 122, 124; Yutzy, 1969:59,60,77,121; Drabek, 1986:182; Faupel, 1985:35).

EXAMPLE: Tornado, Jonesboro, Arkansas, May 15,1968. Local organizations worked separately for the first 5 hours. As initial search and rescue activities drew to a close, several public safety agencies, along with city and county officials had developed something of an emergency coordination group. Organizations represented at this center included the National Guard, sheriff's office, the state highway patrol, the city police, the mayor, and the county judge. Each group set up its own radio-equipped vehicles outside the police station, which became the emergency operations center. And although direct radio contact among the organizations was not possible, they were close enough to each other for runners to pass information, requests, and instructions among them (Stallings, 1971:25).

EXAMPLE: Tornado, Waco, Texas, May 11, 1953. The tornado struck at 4:40 p.m. Uaworski, 1954:129), but coordination did not even begin to emerge until a meeting at state police headquarters at 11:30 p.m. "We finally organized a disaster committee with the power to make the decisions and ... pass final judgment on any particular question (Moore, 1958:14)


NEW DIVISIONS OF LABOR AND RESOURCES REQUIRE COORDINATION

In disasters, the alterations of traditional divisions of labor and resources increase the need for multi-organizational and multi-disciplinary coordination of the various responding participants. Without this coordination, resources may not be shared or distributed according to need. Disaster-related activities, such as search and rescue, traffic control, medical care, and transportation of casualties, may be carried out in a loosely structured, spontaneous manner, with insufficient communication and control. The result can be duplication of effort, omission of essential tasks, and even counterproductive activity (Parr, 1970:425; Wenger, 1986:24,26,32,33; Kilijanek, 1981:126).

EXAMPLE: "During a large-scale fire emergency the water department issued a call to the citizens to hold the use of water to an absolute minimum so that water pressure could be kept up for the fire departments. At the same time, however, fire officials were on T.V. instructing citizens to wet down their roofs with garden hoses." (FEMA, 1981:3)

EXAMPLE: Volcano Eruption, Mt. St. Helens, Washington, May 18, 1980. Response to this disaster was a large and complex undertaking. At least four emergency operations centers and five different base camps were a part of the 14-day operation. Search and rescue covered 600 square miles, eight to nine times over, and involved 2,000 personnel from a multitude of organizations. At least 100 people were saved and 34 bodies recovered. It was one of the largest search and rescue missions in United States history. Unfortunately, the operations of the various organizations were not coordinated. Finally, on the third day, representatives from the three county sheriff's departments and the U.S. Forest Service met and decided to pull their operations under a joint decision-making team composed of a representative from each of the four agencies. The National Guard, however, continued to act independently of this group. Lack of inter-agency coordination resulted in several near mid-air collisions among the numerous aircraft at the site. It was not until the fifth day that the National Guard became integrated into the cooperative effort (Kilijanek, 1981:iii,68,71,74; Drabek, 1981:169).

Figure 4-8. From the 14,000 foot summit of nearby Mt. Adams, climber Vincent Larson captured this photograph of erupting Mt. St. Helens. Fortunately, in spite of being enveloped in ash and fallout within 15 minutes, the climbing party was able to get off the mountain alive. (Courtesy of Vincent R. Larson.)

Evaluations of a number of U. S. disasters illustrating difficulties in coordinating response are summarized in Table 4-5.

The term "mass assault" was used by early researchers to describe the manner in which they observed tasks being carried out at the scene of a disaster. Shortly after impact, there was a massive influx of public safety agencies, equipment, and volunteers. Together with civilians who happened to be in the area, these responders spontaneously came together as informal teams. Under the pressure of great urgency, responders plunged into the first obvious problem they met, wrestled with it until it was overcome by sheer force of numbers, and then moved on to tackle the next problem that confronted them. Little attention was paid to anything except the particular task immediately at hand (Rosow, 1977:16).

Table 4-5. Coordination Problems in Disasters

Disaster	Observations
Tornado Flint-Beecher, MI 1953	The loose control was evident in an uneven distribution of resources in the field (Rosow, 1977:131).
Tornado Waco, TX 1953	It was not until the day after the tornado that a coordinating organization materialized (Moore, 1958:50).
Tornado Worcester, MA 1953	The work of independent agencies was largely uncoordinated (Rosow, 1977:66).
Earthquake Anchorage, AK 1964	Search and rescue was uncoordinated; systematic search of the rubble was not organized until the second day (Yutzy, 1969:149).
Train wreck Chicago, IL 1972	Central control did not exist; a coordinating communications center was not functioning (Cihlar, 1972:17).
Volcano eruption Mt. St. Helens, WA 1980	Real multi-organizational coordination did not begin to take shape until the fifth day (Kilijanek,1981:79).
Hyatt Skywalk collapse Kansas City, MO 1981	There was lack of coordination in obtaining equipment at the scene (Gray,1981:70; Stout,1981:42).
Air Florida crash Washington, DC 1982	There was no single, on-scene commander. Traffic control at the scene was hampered by divided command and lack of central control (Adams, 1982:54).
Metrorail crash Washington, DC 1982	There was very little coordination and control (Edelstein, 1982:161).
Earthquake Coalinga, CA 1983	Poor coordination among responders resulted in misunderstandings, delays, and duplication of effort (Tierney, 1985b:33).

EXAMPLE: Tornado, Flint, Michigan, June 8,1953. One of the worst disasters in Michigan history was the tornado that struck the Flint-Beecher area at 8:29 p.m. on June 8, 1953. It destroyed 340 homes and caused major damage to 107 more. It left in its wake 115 dead and 800 injured. The rescue response was fragmented and disorganized. Several emergency response organizations were involved, but they did not coordinate their activities. A member of a Flint Fire Department rescue team described their activity:

"We would be working our way down this block from one house to the next. But there was some other gang ahead of us and another following right behind, maybe 30 feet away, looking through the place that we just finished. We would shove around a pile of timbers and junk to search through underneath and when we'd finish, the team coming afterwards would push it back to check where we had dumped it."

When asked if this was the same pile of junk that the team ahead of him had shoved around, the firefighter admitted that indeed it was. Nobody checked on his team's work, nor did the team report to anyone the results of their work. There was a multitude of search teams at work, but none knew what the other was doing, and no one was trying to keep track (Rosow, 1977:130).

In spite of improvements in disaster coordination since this classical example from the Flint tornado, one still can observe multiple organizations operating independently without knowledge about what other organizations involved in the disaster response are doing. For example, in a 1986 Disaster Research Center study of six disasters, major problems with coordination occurred in four of them (Wenger, 1986:23,44).

The management of many emergency response and public safety agencies is patterned on the military model. This reflects the belief that the most effective emergency operations are carried out under rigid control exercised from a single commander. Indeed, such a centralized intra-organizational authority structure may be entirely appropriate and effective in the independent, daily, routine operations of these organizations.

In the United States, however, no single organization can legitimately control what all other public and private organizations do and don't do in a peacetime disaster (Drabek, 1980:23; Drabek, 1981:xx; Drabek, 1985b:9; Drabek, 1987:106; Dynes, 1981:29). It has been argued, therefore, that realistic disaster management in a country with a decentralized government such as the United States, with its traditional preferences for local control and private enterprise, probably cannot be accomplished using a military model. Rather, coordination among the various independent responding organizations needs to be based on negotiation and cooperation (Drabek, 1980:23; Drabek, 1981:122; Drabek, 1987: 92,239; Kilijanek, 1981:126; Adams, 1981b:2,52,61; Dynes, 1981:29).

Although it may not be obvious initially, the need for joint decision-making eventually becomes apparent in most large disasters.

The need for joint, inter-organizational direction and decision-making is reflected in three processes which are being used with increasing frequency in disaster responses. These are multi-agency pre-disaster planning (see Chapter 3), emergency operations centers (see Chapter 6), and the unified command structure of the Incident Command System (see Chapter 7).

SUMMARY

Disasters may generate a whole host of problems that are not found in routine emergencies. Organizations change structure, with various positions being filled by different persons. Multiple organizations are faced with overlapping areas of responsibility. Many activities are taken on by unsolicited volunteers. New tasks, sometimes requiring unusual resources, present themselves for which no one has clear-cut responsibility. New organizations even come into being. Multiple organizations are faced with the need to coordinate activities with each other on a moment-by-moment basis, without familiar procedures for carrying this out. Furthermore, all of this may take place under conditions of extreme urgency, which virtually precludes the time required to develop the necessary coordination.


PLANNING CHECKPOINTS

• Does your disaster plan include procedures for determining responsibility for disaster tasks that are not the traditional responsibility of any single organization (for example, overall situation assessment, search and rescue, casualty distribution)? For tasks for which multiple organizations may claim responsibility?
• Does the plan include provisions and procedures for a multi-organizational coordination body?
• Does the plan make provisions to incorporate responding public and private organizations that do not usually play a part in routine emergencies?